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DOCTOR’S ORDERS: THE THIRD CIRCUIT APPROVES SHORTTERM ANNUITIES AS A VIABLE PLANNING TOOL IN ZAHNER v.
SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
JENNIFER A. WARD*
“Financial planning is inherent in the Medicaid scheme . . . .”1
I. SIGNS

AND

SYMPTOMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO LONG-TERM CARE
MEDICAID PLANNING

AND

Meet Roy.2 Suffering from “Crohn’s disease, diabetes, and dementia,” he first entered a nursing home in 2001 and quickly depleted his
resources to pay for his care.3 Roy applied for Medicaid assistance, but his
application was denied because he transferred his home to his family a
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A., 2014, Mount St. Mary’s University. I would like to thank my family and
friends for their support. I would also like to thank Professor Michael Campbell
for providing me with the idea for this Casebrief. Finally, I would like to thank the
members of the Villanova Law Review for their help throughout this entire process.
The title of this Casebrief was inspired by Jerold E. Rothkoff, The Zahner Decision—
Court Approves Use of Medicaid Compliant Annuities, ROTHKOFF L. GRP. (Oct. 18,
2015), http://rothkofflaw.com/the-zahner-decision-court-approves-use-of-medi
caid-compliant-annuities/ [https://perma.cc/ZQ3G-234U], Court Approves Use of
Short-Term Annuities for Medicaid Planning, ELDER L. ANSWERS (Nov. 24, 2015),
http://www.elderlawanswers.com/court-approves-use-of-short-term-annuities-formedicaid-planning—15317 [https://perma.cc/TY8V-2SEV], and David Zumpano,
Analyzing the Zahner Holding: Moving Forward Using Short-Term Annuities As Successful
Planning Tools, LAW. WITH PURPOSE (Oct. 1, 2015, 5:11 PM), http://blog.la
wyerswithpurpose.com/2015/10/analyzing-the-zahner-holding-moving-forward-us
ing-short-term-annuities-as-successful-planning-tools.html [https://perma.cc/
DYW9-GNWK].
1. Zahner v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Human Servs., 802 F.3d 497, 509 (3d Cir.
2015) (stating intrinsic nature of financial planning found in Medicaid).
2. See Claudia Williams, James Rosen & Molly O’Malley, Profiles of Nursing
Home Residents on Medicaid, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 14 (July 2006), https://
kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7510.pdf [https://perma.
cc/WHB6-KWBQ] (discussing background of nursing home resident on Medicaid). In 2006, the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation’s Commission on Medicaid
and the Uninsured profiled seven nursing home residents whose care is covered by
Medicaid. See id. at 9–15 (profiling seven Americans residing in nursing homes).
Although this Casebrief mentions only one nursing home resident, the study provides great insight into a challenge faced by many Americans and their families:
the inability to pay for long-term care. See id. at 3–6 (discussing growing demand
for long-term care and increased concern about financing it); see also Caitlin Kelly,
Covering the Rising Cost of Long-Term Care, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2013, at F3, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/15/business/retirementspecial/coveringthe-rising-cost-of-long-term-care.html [https://perma.cc/RT5F-U3XM] (“Preparing for the cost of long-term care is now a concern for many aging Americans.”).
3. See Williams et al., supra note 2, at 14 (describing nursing home resident’s
illnesses and stay in nursing home facility).
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year earlier.4 Because this transfer “occurred within [Medicaid’s] lookback period,” Roy became ineligible for Medicaid assistance, even though
he had no other assets to pay for his care.5
The experience described above is not unusual.6 As the U.S. population ages at a high rate, the demand for long-term care has become a very
real problem.7 As a result, some Americans turn to Medicaid to cover the
costs of long-term care.8 To qualify for Medicaid, individuals must meet
specific requirements, essentially “exhaust[ing]” their assets in the process.9 Many spend all of their assets either before entering a nursing
4. See id. (discussing reasons for denial of Medicaid application).
5. See id. (explaining impact of “asset transfer” on Medicaid application). Following his denial, Roy and his niece sought legal advice. See id. Roy’s niece sold
the home and used the funds to pay for Roy’s nursing home bills and other fees
until he was finally eligible for Medicaid. See id. For an explanation of Medicaid’s
look-back period, see infra notes 58–62, 67–68 and accompanying text.
6. See id. at 12 (discussing other resident’s loss of Medicaid eligibility after
selling home). As previously noted, Profiles of Nursing Home Residents on Medicaid
discusses several nursing home residents whose Medicaid eligibility was affected by
the presence or absence of assets. See id. at 9–11, 13, 15.
7. See Alison Barnes, An Assessment of Medicaid Planning, 3 HOUS. J. HEALTH L.
& POL’Y 265, 280 (2003) (“[T]he prospect of the numbers of aging baby boomers
in the next twenty years causes concern about an absolute increase in the numbers
of nursing home residents.” (citing CITIZENS FOR LONG TERM CARE, Defining Common Ground: Long Term Care Financing Reform in 2001, 2 J. POST-ACUTE & LONGTERM CARE MED. 187, 187 (2001))); Karla Levinson, Comment, Long-Term Care
Alert: An Analysis of Delaware’s Approach to Medicaid Planning Techniques and Why
Curbing Medicaid Planning Will Not Solve the Nation’s Long-Term Care Problem, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 223, 223–24, 239–41 (2006) (discussing United States’ aging population); see also Kelly, supra note 2 (questioning how long-term care for retiring baby
boomers will be paid); Rick Jurgens, Despite Offerings, Nursing Home Beds and Funds
Still Lacking, VALLEY NEWS, http://www.vnews.com/news/20415849-95/caring-forcritical-needs [https://perma.cc/P6DS-DA34] (last updated Feb. 1, 2016) (“About
12 million Americans receive long-term care—services that extend for at least nine
months and help individuals with serious physical or cognitive limitations cope
with health-related and other challenges of daily life—in communities or in nursing homes or other institutions . . . .”).
8. See Ellen O’Brien, Medicaid’s Coverage of Nursing Home Costs: Asset Shelter for
the Wealthy or Essential Safety Net?, GEORGETOWN UNIV. LONG-TERM CARE FIN. PROJECT 1 (May 2005), http://www.canhr.org/reports/2005/nursinghomecosts.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2LQZ-WSK5] (reporting Medicaid paid for “[n]early half of
the nation’s nursing home bill . . . in 2003”); see also Levinson, supra note 7, at 224
(discussing prevalence of Medicaid in providing funding for “long-term care services”); Williams et al., supra note 2, at 1 (acknowledging Medicaid contributed to
forty-six percent of nursing home costs in 2003). In 2003, nursing home costs
exceeded $100 billion. See id.
9. See Timothy Waidmann & Korbin Liu, Asset Transfer and Nursing Home Use:
Empirical Evidence and Policy Significance, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 1 (Apr.
2006), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7487.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7MWP-799Y] (illustrating Medicaid eligibility requirements).
For further discussion of the requirements of Medicaid eligibility, including the
specific requirements for individuals in Pennsylvania, see infra notes 34–52 and
accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol61/iss4/5

2

Ward: Doctor's Orders: The Third Circuit Approves Short-Term Annuities

2016]

CASEBRIEF

731

home or during their stay on the care itself.10 For individuals who wish to
leave something behind for their loved ones, Medicaid planning is an attractive option.11 With help from elder law attorneys, individuals can strategically give away and shield their assets from consideration as “available
resources” when applying for Medicaid.12
Fearing abuse of the Medicaid system, federal and state legislatures
began to restrict how much Medicaid planning individuals could actually
do.13 In 2005, Congress passed the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) with the
goal of closing loopholes in the Medicaid statute that had allowed for financial planning.14 The DRA also provided a safe harbor provision for
10. See Catherine M. Reif, A Penny Saved Can Be a Penalty Earned: Nursing
Homes, Medicaid Planning, The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, and the Problem of Transferring Assets, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 339, 340–43 (2010) (explaining how
individuals exhaust assets before qualifying for Medicaid); see also Williams et al.,
supra note 2, at 9 (recounting how married couple spent $165,409 on long-term
care before becoming eligible for Medicaid assistance).
11. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 7, at 267 (explaining Medicaid planning); Levinson, supra note 7, at 227 (“[S]ome people are employing attorneys to help them
plan ahead and transfer their assets properly so that they can qualify for Medicaid
benefits without losing their life savings. Many techniques exist for people to protect their assets and still receive Medicaid benefits.”(footnote omitted)); Waidmann & Liu, supra note 9, at 1 (indicating individuals will “find ways to shelter any
assets [to qualify for Medicaid]”).
12. See Barnes, supra note 7, at 267 (noting frequent use of assets to become
eligible for Medicaid); Milan Markovic, Lawyers and the Welfare State, 84 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1845, 1854 (2016) (“Lawyers have nevertheless devised numerous financial
impoverishment techniques to allow clients to preserve wealth and qualify for
Medicaid.”); Levinson, supra note 7, at 227 (discussing how individuals employ attorneys to help with Medicaid planning); see also Guide to Long-Term Care Planning:
Medicaid Planning, NAT’L CARE PLANNING COUNCIL, http://www.longtermcarelink.
net/eldercare/medicaid_planning.htm [https://perma.cc/CU68-V7Z9] (last visited Oct. 18, 2016) [hereinafter Medicaid Planning Guide] (providing guide to
Medicaid planning). When applying for Medicaid, individuals must report all
available resources in order for their eligibility to be determined. See Levinson,
supra note 7, at 225 (explaining Medicaid application process). Not all assets
“count” as being available. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (listing exempt assets for Medicaid eligibility determination). Assets like a person’s “primary
residence [and] personal possessions” do not count in determining Medicaid eligibility. See id. (reporting which resources do not count for determining eligibility).
For further discussion of the Medicaid application and which assets figure in Medicaid eligibility determinations, see infra notes 34–52 and accompanying text.
13. See Reif, supra note 10, at 347 (stating Congress acted to “address[ ] Medicaid abuses”); Levinson, supra note 7, at 227 (detailing efforts by government to
decrease use of Medicaid planning); Michelle Higgins, States Crack down on Families
That Shed Assets to Get Benefits, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2003, 12:01 AM), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB1046113343874461543 [https://perma.cc/A7C8-C8L8]
(“States and counties have begun to crack down on people who purposely make
themselves poor so the government will pay for their nursing-home care.”).
14. See generally Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat.
4; see also Reif, supra note 10, at 347 (discussing purpose and effect of DRA); Levinson, supra note 7, at 227 (“[The DRA] has a huge impact on Medicaid qualification
rules.”).
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annuities, shielding qualified annuities from being counted as available
resources.15
Recently, in Zahner v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Human Services,16 the Third Circuit examined whether short-term annuities, a specific instrument used in Medicaid planning, qualified for the DRA’s safe
harbor provision.17 If so, assets used to purchase short-term annuities
would be sheltered from factoring into individuals’ eligibility for Medicaid.18 Holding that short-term annuities can qualify for protection, the
Third Circuit’s decision signifies that the DRA did not completely foreclose the “use of short-term annuities in Medicaid planning.”19
This Casebrief argues that the Third Circuit’s Zahner decision is a win
for elder law attorneys and their clients, as it solidifies the viability of the
15. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(c)(1)(F), (G)(ii) (2012); Zahner v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t
of Human Servs., 802 F.3d 497, 501 (3d Cir. 2015) (mentioning DRA’s safe harbor
provision); see also Matthew J. Marcus, Many Effective Medicaid Planning Strategies Still
Exist After the DRA, 35 EST. PLAN. 24, 26–28 (2008) (explaining how individuals may
use annuities in Medicaid planning); Renee Carlson, Comment, Protecting the Nursing Home Industry and the Elderly Following the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, 82 TEMP. L.
REV. 1303, 1332 (2010) (“In order to minimize the likelihood of incurring a penalty period and resultant eviction for nonpayment, individuals and their attorneys
need to make use of more advisable planning techniques, such as use of annuities . . . .” (citing STEPHEN A. FELDMAN, STEVE FELDMAN ON LONG-TERM CARE PLANNING 257–58 (2006))); ETTINGER LAW FIRM, More on Short Term Annuities and
Medicaid Planning, N.Y. ELDER L. ATT’Y BLOG (Dec. 23, 2015), http://www.new
yorkelderlawattorneyblog.com/2015/12/short-term-annuities-medicaid-planning.
html [https://perma.cc/7ZBK-627C] [hereinafter More on Short Term Annuities]
(discussing how short-term annuities may be used in Medicaid planning); The Appropriate Use of Short-Term Medicaid Compliant Annuities, KRAUSE FIN. SERVICES BLOG,
https://www.medicaidannuity.com/the-appropriate-use-of-short-term-medicaidcompliant-annuities-3/ [https://perma.cc/5P5P-CQWP] (last visited Oct. 18,
2016) (noting when use of short-term annuities is appropriate).
16. 802 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2015).
17. See id. at 499 (stating reason for appeal). An annuity is a financial tool
that can be used in Medicaid planning. See Barnes, supra note 7, at 292–93 (discussing how annuities are used in Medicaid planning). The Supreme Court has
defined annuity as a “contract[ ] under which the purchaser makes one or more
premium payments to the issuer in exchange for a series of payments, which continue either for a fixed period or for the life of the purchaser or a designated
beneficiary.” See NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513
U.S. 251, 254 (1995) (defining “annuity”); Barnes, supra note 7, at 292 (“An annuity is established by a contract in which the buyer pays a sum of money in exchange
for a promise that payments will be made to the buyer on an agreed upon schedule and rate.” (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 88 (7th ed. 1999))). For further
discussion of how annuities can be used in Medicaid planning, see infra notes
75–91 and accompanying text.
18. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 509 (determining annuities fall under DRA’s safe
harbor provision).
19. See David Zumpano, Analyzing the Zahner Holding: Moving Forward Using
Short-Term Annuities As Successful Planning Tools, LAW. WITH PURPOSE (Oct. 1, 2015,
5:11 PM), http://blog.lawyerswithpurpose.com/2015/10/analyzing-the-zahner-ho
lding-moving-forward-using-short-term-annuities-as-successful-planning-tools.html
[https://perma.cc/DYW9-GNWK] (examining meaning of Zahner for elder law
practitioners).
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use of short-term annuities in Medicaid planning.20 Part II examines how
individuals take part in Medicaid planning, including a discussion of the
DRA and the use of annuities in planning.21 Part III presents the facts of
Zahner and reviews the Third Circuit’s analysis.22 Part IV analyzes the
Third Circuit’s decision to approve the use of short-term annuities.23 Part
V advises elder law practitioners on the use of short-term annuities going
forward.24 Part VI concludes by discussing the long-term viability of shortterm annuities.25
II. FILLING OUT PATIENT HISTORY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF MEDICAID
PLANNING, THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT, AND THE USE OF
ANNUITIES IN MEDICAID PLANNING
One year in a nursing home will cost a Pennsylvania resident over
$100,000.26 Even for an individual who saved for retirement, a few years
in a nursing home could quickly exhaust savings and leave nothing behind
for that individual’s family.27 This is where Medicaid and Medicaid plan20. For an analysis of Zahner’s impact on Medicaid planning and its role in
solidifying short-term annuities as a viable planning tool, see infra notes 156–95
and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of Medicaid planning, specifically the Deficit Reduction
Act’s impact and the use of annuities in planning, see infra notes 26–91 and accompanying text.
22. For discussion of the facts of Zahner and the Third Circuit’s analysis, see
infra notes 92–155 and accompanying text.
23. For an analysis of the Third Circuit’s holding in Zahner, see infra notes
156–90 and accompanying text.
24. For discussion of what Zahner means for practitioners wishing to use shortterm annuities in planning, see infra notes 184–90 and accompanying text.
25. For discussion of the future of annuities and Medicaid planning, see infra
notes 191–95 and accompanying text.
26. See 2015 Cost of Care Survey Pennsylvania, GENWORTH (Apr. 1, 2015), https:/
/www.genworth.com/dam/Americas/US/PDFs/Consumer/corporate/cost-ofcare/118928PA_040115_gnw.pdf [https://perma.cc/DE9E-HN8L] (reporting annual median cost of semi-private nursing home room in Pennsylvania in 2015).
For those in the Philadelphia–Camden–Wilmington area, the rate reached
$114,610. See id. (listing median annual rate in Philadelphia metropolitan area).
Both rates were higher than the U.S. median annual rate, which was $80,300. See
id. (reporting annual median rate for United States). Although Pennsylvania’s median annual rate topped that of the United States, it was the lowest in the tri-state
area (which includes Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New Jersey). Compare id., with
2015 Cost of Care Survey Delaware, GENWORTH (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.gen
worth.com/dam/Americas/US/PDFs/Consumer/corporate/cost-of-care/118928
DE_040115_gnw.pdf [https://perma.cc/BUV7-AUDM] (reporting annual median
rate for semi-private nursing home room in Delaware of $109,500), and 2015 Cost
of Care Survey New Jersey, GENWORTH (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.genworth.com/
dam/Americas/US/PDFs/Consumer/corporate/cost-of-care/
118928NJ_040115_gnw.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KVH-9VJZ] (reporting annual
median rate for semi-private nursing home room in New Jersey of $116,800).
27. See Sean R. Bleck, Barbara Isenhour & John A. Miller, Preserving Wealth and
Inheritance Through Medicaid Planning for Long-Term Care, 17 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. &
L. 153, 154–55 (2013) (“[T]he costs of long term health care represent one of the
greatest financial risks of old age. Indeed, for most people a period of extended
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ning become factors.28 Medicaid planning helps individuals qualify for
Medicaid without completely depleting their assets.29 Both federal and
state governments disfavor Medicaid planning and require elder law practitioners and their clients either to comply with restrictions on transfers or
face penalties.30
A.

Name and Date of Birth: An Introduction to the Basics of Medicaid and
Medicaid Planning

Established in 1965, Medicaid is the largest provider of health services
in the United States.31 Medicare, while designated as the health care opdisability leads to impoverishment . . . . deeply degrad[ing] or even eliminat[ing]
the prospects for inheritance by the disabled person’s family.” (footnote omitted)); see also Levinson, supra note 7, at 223 (theorizing how quickly one can spend
$100,000 in savings on nursing home care); Kelly, supra 2 (“F[ew] sticker shocks
are as bracing as the price of hiring someone to help with the simplest activities—
bathing, toilet use, dressing, eating and moving. Whether recovering from surgery
or a stroke or suffering a chronic illness like arthritis, those needing skilled help
need deep pockets indeed.”).
28. See Waidmann & Liu, supra note 9, at 1–2 (discussing Medicaid eligibility
and practice of Medicaid planning); see also Barnes, supra note 7, at 267 (defining
Medicaid planning); Reif, supra note 10, at 348 (discussing criticism of those who
engage in Medicaid planning); Levinson, supra note 7, at 227–28 (explaining
Medicaid planning); Higgins, supra note 13 (“For years, thousands of middle-class
and even affluent retirees—terrified that long-term health-care costs could wipe
out their savings—have transferred their assets to relatives in order to qualify for
Medicaid, the government health plan for the poor.”). Although there are those
who engage in Medicaid planning, it is important to note that it may not be as
prevalent as believed. See O’Brien, supra note 8, at 3 (“There is little evidence that
large numbers of the elderly are planning their estates for the purpose of gaining
easy access to Medicaid in the event they need nursing home care.”). In a 2005
study, Professor Ellen O’Brien found that empirical data did not support the notion that large numbers of elderly Americans transfer assets in order to qualify for
Medicaid. See id. at 5 (noting “research studies confirm that Medicaid-induced
transfers are not widespread among current or likely nursing home residents”).
29. See Barnes, supra note 7, at 267 (“[A]rranging assets and income for an
individual or couple in order to achieve earlier Medicaid eligibility . . . is an important legal service that is identified with the broader field of elder law.”); Bleck et
al., supra note 27, at 155 (defining Medicaid planning).
30. See Cori Nichols, The Impact of the DRA on Estate and Long-Term Care Planning, 49-NOV ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 46, 47–48 (2007) (illustrating different aspects of DRA with which individuals must comply when transferring assets); see also
Waidmann & Liu, supra note 9, at 1 (“Because Medicaid was designed to be a safety
net only for the poor, asset transfer practices are thought to distort the intent of
the Medicaid program and unnecessarily inflate public spending.”).
31. See Medicaid Reform: A Preliminary Report, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASSOC. 1 (June
15, 2005), http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/0506medicaid.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8X9Q-EAY7] (acknowledging Medicaid’s role in providing
health care); Levinson, supra note 7, at 224 (“Medicaid is the nation’s largest
health care program.” (quoting Medicaid Reform, A Preliminary Report, supra note 31,
at 1) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Barnes, supra note 7, at 269
(noting creation of Medicaid in 1965).
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tion for older Americans, does not cover the cost of long-term care.32
Medicaid, however, does cover long-term care.33
1.

Qualifying for Medicaid in Pennsylvania

Medicaid is jointly run by the federal government and the states.34
Although states can create their own requirements for Medicaid eligibility,
their regulations must comply with federal guidelines.35 In addition, state
Medicaid regulations cannot be more restrictive than federal standards.36
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services provide states with a State
Medicaid Manual to “assist[ ] states in interpreting the complex labyrinth
of statutory and regulatory requirements that govern receipt of Medicare
and Medicaid benefits.”37
32. See Reif, supra note 10, at 344 (“Medicaid is the only federal government
program that pays for long-term nursing home care.”); see also Barnes, supra note 7,
at 269 (describing Medicare as “a program of health care services for elderly and
long-term disabled people”). Although this Casebrief focuses on long-term care in
nursing homes, individuals can also receive care in the community, meaning the
home, either from health care professionals or family members. See Bleck, et al.,
supra note 27, at 159–60 (discussing long-term care found in individuals’ homes);
see also Williams, Rosen & O’Malley, supra note 2, at 12 (recounting how nursing
home resident received care at home prior to stay in nursing home).
33. See Barnes, supra note 7, at 266 (“The basic federal rules of the program
require the states to cover institutional care, such as long-term care nursing home
services for a restricted group of eligible people.”); see also Stephen A. Moses, The
Brave New World of Long-Term Care, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 561,
562 (2007) (describing federal government’s involvement in paying for long-term
care through Medicaid).
34. See Levinson, supra note 7, at 225 (noting Medicaid’s status as jointly run).
35. See id. (“The federal government provides general guidelines for the states
to follow, but actual requirements vary from state to state.” (citing U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., MEDICAID AT-A-GLANCE 2005: A MEDICAID INFORMATION SOURCE 1, http:// www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidGenInfo/Downloads/MedicaidAtAGlance2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2UW-JHYP])); see also Reif, supra
note 10, at 344 (“The federal government shares the cost of the Medicaid program
with the states, who must ensure their programs comply with federal Medicaid
requirements and regulations.” (footnote omitted) (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a
(West 2009); Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154, 157 (1986))).
36. See Zahner v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Human Servs., 802 F.3d 497, 512 (3d Cir.
2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i)(III) (2012)) (stating “states may not
create more restrictive requirements”); see also Geston v. Anderson, 729 F.3d 1077,
1085–86 (8th Cir. 2013) (“If the State’s public policy requires it to count as resources certain annuities that federal law excludes from the scope of resources that
may be considered in making eligibility determinations, then the State’s methodology is more restrictive than the federal methodology.” (citing 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i), (r)(2)(B)) (2012))).
37. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 501 (noting states receive guidance from federal
government); see also generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., The State
Medicaid Manual, https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/
Manuals/Paper-Based-Manuals-Items/CMS021927.html?DLPage=1&DLEntries=10
&DLSort=0&DLSortDir=ascending [https://perma.cc/Q3ZS-T2GB] (last visited
Oct. 18, 2016) [hereinafter State Medicaid Manual].
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To qualify for Medicaid, individuals and, if married, their spouses,
must meet certain income and resource thresholds.38 Individuals may be
“categorically needy” or “medically needy.”39 “Categorically needy persons [are] defined as those with incomes low enough to qualify them for
government income assistance . . . . [while] [m]edically needy people [are
those] who would be eligible for Medicaid but for the fact that their income or property exceeds financial guidelines.”40 For the medically
needy, health care costs are counted against their excess income.41
In Pennsylvania, individuals must meet both “financial and non-financial eligibility requirements.”42 The Pennsylvania Department of Human
Services (DHS), the agency responsible for running Pennsylvania’s Medicaid program, asks whether an individual (1) is “a U.S. citizen or a qualified non-citizen” and “a resident of Pennsylvania,” (2) “ha[s] a Social
Security number,” and (3) is “medically need[y].”43

38. See Levinson, supra note 7, at 225–28 (discussing Medicaid requirements);
see also Barnes, supra note 7, at 266 (“[T]he general policy of the United States
continues to be: Government funds will not be expended for long-term care costs
for those who do not meet poverty eligibility limits.”).
39. See Barnes, supra note 7, at 270 (establishing two types of need requirements); see also Spero, Asset Protection: Legal Planning, Strategies, and Forms ¶ 14.03
(2d ed. Westlaw 2016) (“Two categories of individuals generally are eligible to receive Medicaid: the categorically needy and the medically needy.”).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (describing who qualifies for Medicaid
because of their financial situations); Barnes, supra note 7, at 270 (footnotes omitted) (explaining who is categorically eligible for Medicaid); see also 1 Joan M.
Krauskopf, et al., ELDERLAW ADVOC. AGING § 11.14 (2d ed. Westlaw 2015) (database
updated Nov. 2015) (“The medically needy are those individuals whose income
exceeds the levels allowed for the cash assistance programs (SSI or AFDC), but is
insufficient to meet the cost of necessary medical services.”); Spero, supra note 39,
at 1 (defining “categorically needy” and “medically needy”).
41. See Barnes, supra note 7, at 270 (explaining that eligibility results from
“incurring health and long-term care costs”); see also Krauskopf, supra note 40 (discussing how “individuals are allowed to ‘spend-down’ their excess income to the
level at which they qualify for Medicaid benefits”).
42. See Medical Assistance and Payment of Long Term Care Services, PA. DEP’T OF
HUMAN SERVS., http://www.dhs.pa.gov/citizens/longtermcareservices/medicalas
sistanceandpaymentoflongtermcareservices/#.Vp1UIK88KK0 [https://perma.cc/
QTQ9-TPYM] (last visited Oct. 8, 2016) [hereinafter Long-Term Care Requirements]
(listing Medicaid requirements for Pennsylvania residents). The Pennsylvania Department of Human Services (DHS) publishes Medicaid eligibility requirements in
their Long-Term Care Handbook. See generally PA. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., Long-Term
Care Handbook, available at http://services.dpw.state.pa.us/oimpolicymanuals/ltc/
Long-Term_Care_Handbook.htm [https://perma.cc/2Z79-E38V] [hereinafter
Long-Term Care Handbook].
43. See Long-Term Care Requirements, supra note 42 (listing non-financial eligibility requirements). To be considered medically needy, an individual must have a
doctor “complete a form telling [DHS] of the medical need.” See id. (detailing
medically-needy requirement). The DHS will then review the individual’s need to
determine eligibility for long-term care. See id. (describing DHS’s process for determining medical need).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol61/iss4/5

8

Ward: Doctor's Orders: The Third Circuit Approves Short-Term Annuities

2016]

CASEBRIEF

737

Pennsylvania’s financial eligibility requirements focus on an individual’s income and other resources.44 Income can be calculated from various sources, such as Social Security or “withdrawals” from an Individual
Retirement Account (IRA).45 An individual’s income cannot exceed
“300% of the Federal Benefit Rate,” which is currently $733.00 per
month.46 If a medically-needy individual’s income exceeds the income
limit, he or she can still qualify for assistance by deducting the cost of longterm care “to reduce [his or her] monthly income.”47 Aside from a government-specified monthly personal allowance, all of an individual’s income must go toward paying for nursing home care, with Medicaid
picking up the residual cost.48
Pennsylvania also considers an individual’s other resources to determine Medicaid eligibility, including “[b]ank accounts[,] [s]tocks,” and
“IRA [ ] accounts.”49 Individuals with income below 300% of the Federal
Benefit Rate cannot have more than $2,000 in resources.50 For those with
income above 300% of the Federal Benefit Rate, the resource limit is
$2,400.51 Additionally, Pennsylvania has special rules for married individuals seeking Medicaid assistance in order to avoid impoverishing the
“community spouse”—the spouse not seeking nursing home care and
thereby remaining in the community.52
44. See id. (listing Pennsylvania’s financial eligibility factors).
45. See id. (listing what DHS considers income for determining Medicaid eligibility). Pennsylvania also considers “[p]ensions[,] [i]nterest and dividends from
savings and investments,” and “[r]ental [i]ncome.” See id.
46. See id. (declaring Pennsylvania’s income limit). For 2016, the Federal
Benefit Rate is $733 per month, meaning individuals in Pennsylvania can have an
income as high as $2,199 per month to be considered financially eligible for Medicaid. See SSI Federal Payment Amounts for 2016, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://
www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/SSI.html [https://perma.cc/CB6B-63RB] (last visited Oct.
8, 2016) (stating Federal Benefit Rate for 2016).
47. See Long-Term Care Requirements, supra note 42 (detailing income requirements for medically needy).
48. See Reif, supra note 10, at 345 (discussing senior citizen’s contribution to
nursing home costs).
49. See Long-Term Care Requirements, supra note 42 (listing what Pennsylvania
considers resources). Pennsylvania also counts “bonds and mutual funds,” “Keogh
accounts,” “non-resident[ial] property,” and the “cash value of life insurance [policies]” that exceed $1,500. See id. An individual’s home does not count as a resource if it is “less than or equal to $525,000.” See id. (stating exclusion of home as
resource if valued at $525,000 or less). For a home to be excluded, Pennsylvania
also requires that the individual plans “to return to the home or [is] residing in
the home,” or that the individual’s “spouse or dependent resides in the home.” See
id. Additionally, an individual’s motor vehicle, burial space, and burial funds are
also excluded. See id. (listing what is not counted as resource).
50. See id. (stating resource limit).
51. See id. (stating resource limit).
52. See id. (stating requirements for married persons seeking long-term assistance). In Pennsylvania, there is no limit on community spouses’ income because
they are “not required to pay for the institutionalized spouse’s long term care services.” See id. (reciting income rule for community spouses). Additionally, the
state considers the spouse using long-term care and the community spouse’s re-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 5

738
2.

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61: p. 729

Medicaid Planning

For individuals whose financial situation does not automatically qualify them for Medicaid, becoming eligible requires planning and depleting
resources.53 To become eligible, individuals can take multiple steps.54
They can spend all of their resources, whether on home improvements or
a luxury vehicle.55 If individuals do not want to spend all of their resources, they can also transfer them away by undertaking Medicaid
planning.56
Medicaid planning is a skill, which is why individuals often seek the
help of attorneys.57 Although individuals can transfer resources away,
through either gifts or financial instruments, the government imposes limsources together. See id. (discussing resource limit for married individuals). Pennsylvania also allows the community spouse to keep one-half of the couple’s
resources, so long as the amount does not exceed that maximum amount set by
the state. See id. (discussing resource limit for married individuals). Pennsylvania
allowed community spouses to keep up to $119,200 in resources in 2016. See LongTerm Care Handbook, supra note 42, at ch. 440, app. A (listing Pennsylvania’s allowance for community spouses); see also 2016 SSI and Spousal Impoverishment Standards,
MEDICAID, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/eligibility/downloads/2016-ssi-and-spousal-impoverishment-standards.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3FN9-6MFY] (listing federal spousal impoverishment limits for
2016).
53. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 7, at 267 (describing Medicaid planning); Levinson, supra note 7, at 227 (“[S]ome people are employing attorneys to help them
plan ahead and transfer their assets properly so that they can qualify for Medicaid
benefits without losing their life savings. Many techniques exist for people to protect their assets and still receive Medicaid benefits.” (footnotes omitted));
Waidmann & Liu, supra note 9, at 1 (implying that individuals “find ways to shelter
any assets” to qualify for Medicaid).
54. See Higgins, supra note 13 (explaining “[h]ow to [i]mpoverish
[y]ourself”); see also Barnes, supra note 7, at 283–89 (discussing ways individuals
can transfer assets); Reif, supra note 10, at 340–42 (providing examples of how
individuals may shed resources).
55. See Higgins, supra note 13 (“[T]he strategy is to spend on assets that generally aren’t counted . . . in determining eligibility. So people buy a new car. They
pay down their home mortgage or they remodel their home.”); see also Barnes,
supra note 7, at 288 (commenting that people will spend money to “acquire or
improve an exempt asset”); Reif, supra note 10, at 341 (hypothesizing about senior
citizen who purchased luxury vehicle and renovated kitchen to become eligible for
Medicaid).
56. See Barnes, supra note 7, at 292–93 (describing use of annuities in Medicaid planning); Levinson, supra note 7, at 228 (“While there are many Medicaid
planning techniques available, one of the most common asset-protection techniques is purchasing certain types of annuities to convert otherwise countable resources into income.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Higgins, supra
note 13, at D2)).
57. See Barnes, supra note 7, at 267 (stating how Medicaid planning is subset
of elder law practice); see also Jeffrey Marshall, Three Ways to Protect Your Assets from
Nursing Home Costs, MARSHALL, PARKER & WEBER, LLC (July 17, 2013), http://
www.paelderlaw.com/three-ways-to-protect-your-assets-from-nursing-home-costs/
[https://perma.cc/4KRP-YWVX] (explaining how elder law attorney can help with
Medicaid planning).
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its on how much individuals can transfer without facing penalties.58 In
Pennsylvania, the DHS reviews all assets transferred within the look-back
period, the sixty months prior to an individual qualifying for Medicaid.59 If
a transaction is found to be less than fair market value (FMV), the DHS
will levy a penalty on the individual.60 To determine the penalty, the DHS
divides the asset’s uncompensated value (FMV minus the amount received) by the “average daily [cost] for [long-term] care services.”61 The
DHS then imposes the penalty on an individual’s first day of eligibility and
“will not pay for long-term care services [during the penalty period].”62
B.

Past Treatment: Congress Tries to Limit Medicaid Eligibility with the Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005

Congress passed the DRA in 2005.63 Aimed at closing “loopholes” in
the Medicaid statute, the DRA had a significant impact on Medicaid planning.64 First, the DRA instituted fractional periods of ineligibility for indi58. See Barnes, supra note 7, at 284 (discussing ineligibility when transfers are
“less than fair market value”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c) (2012) (outlining which
transfers of assets affect eligibility and which transfers do not); Marcus, supra note
15, at 24–26 (explaining exceptions to Medicaid’s rules on transfers of assets); Levinson, supra note 7, at 227 (summarizing Medicaid penalty rules).
59. See Long-Term Care Requirements, supra note 42 (requiring look-back period
for asset transfers); see also Barnes, supra note 7, at 284–85 (discussing look-back
period); Bleck, Isenhour & Miller, supra note 27, at 170 (discussing imposition of
penalty as result of transfers made during look-back period); Levinson, supra note
7, at 227–28 (discussing look back-period and penalties created by DRA). As of
2005, a look back period of sixty months is required. See Levinson, supra note 7, at
228 (noting DRA increased look-back period to five years). Gifts made before the
look-back period are not subject to penalty. See Bleck, Isenhour & Miller, supra
note 27, at 172 (explaining how gifts made before look back period are not penalized); Levinson, supra note 7, at 228 (stating penalty period will apply to transfers
made within look-back period).
60. See Long-Term Care Requirements, supra note 42 (“If FMV is not received, a
period of ineligibility, known as a penalty period, is established.”); see also Levinson, supra note 7, at 227 (noting imposition of penalties for transfers of resources
“at less than fair market value”).
61. See Long-Term Care Requirements, supra note 42 (reciting calculation of penalty period); see also Levinson, supra note 7, at 227 (discussing how penalty is
determined).
62. See Long-Term Care Requirements, supra note 42 (announcing imposition of
penalty on individual).
63. See generally Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-71, 120 Stat. 4;
see also Moses, supra note 33, at 565 (referencing passage of DRA); Nichols, supra
note 30, at 46 (referencing DRA); Reif, supra note 10, at 347 (examining passage
of DRA).
64. See Nichols, supra note 30, at 46 (“The DRA aims to reduce government
spending by cutting federal funding of the Medicaid program and tighten Medicaid’s long-term care eligibility requirements.”). When President George W. Bush
signed the DRA into law, he mentioned how the bill was a reaction to people
abusing Medicaid. See Reif, supra note 10, at 347 (“The bill tightens the loopholes
that allowed people to game the system by transferring assets to their children so
they can qualify for Medicaid benefits.” (quoting President George W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (Feb. 8, 2006), available at
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viduals who made small transfers of assets.65 Under the DRA, each small
transfer is combined to create a larger, cumulative penalty.66 It also expanded the look-back period from “three years to five years,” making the
timing of asset transfers even more important.67 Transfers made during
the look-back period for less than FMV are assessed for a penalty.68 In
addition, the DRA changed the time at which a penalty period begins,
“mak[ing] it harder for a Medicaid applicant to transfer assets and qualify
for Medicaid.”69 Rather than running the penalty clock as soon as a transfer is made, the penalty period begins when an individual, after depleting
all of his or her assets first, applies for Medicaid.70 Therefore, individuals
may find themselves unable to pay for care during a penalty period.71
Regarding resources, homes remain an exempt asset in determining
Medicaid eligibility, but the exemption is not limitless.72 Individuals with
“homes with more than $500,000 . . . in equity” cannot receive Medicaid
benefits, but “[s]tates can elect to increase that amount up to $750,000.”73
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65171 [https://perma.cc/PN2Y-RN
7H])).
65. See Nichols, supra note 30, at 47 (stating states “must [ ] apply partial
months of ineligibility”); Reif, supra note 10, at 357–58 (describing “fractional”
penalty periods).
66. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(c)(1)(E)(i)–(iv) (2012); see also Nichols, supra
note 30, at 47 (explaining how fractional penalty periods are applied); Reif, supra
note 10, at 358 (illustrating how penalty periods are combined into single period).
67. See Nichols, supra note 30, at 47 (discussing extension of look-back period
under DRA).
68. See id. at 47 (“Medicaid reviews any asset transfers at less than fair market
value (divesting assets, giving cash gifts or transferring mortgage titles to family)
prior to application for Medicaid benefits in order to determine eligibility.”); see
also Reif, supra note 10, at 355 (discussing how penalty period is determined). For
discussion of how Pennsylvania uses the look-back period and determines the penalty period, see supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text.
69. See Reif, supra note 10, at 352 (citing Jason Frank, The Case for Asset Protection, 205 ELDER L. ADVISORY 1, 3–4 (2008)) (discussing impact of new start date for
penalty periods); see also Nichols, supra note 30, at 47 (discussing new start date of
penalty).
70. See Reif, supra note 10, at 352 (examining change in imposition of penalty
period); see also Nichols, supra note 30, at 47 (noting when penalty period begins
for Medicaid applicants); Carlson, supra 15, at 1308 (“Formerly, the penalty period
began to run when the transfer was made, but the new provisions dictate that the
penalty period in most cases will not begin until the individual would otherwise be
eligible for Medicaid.” (footnote omitted) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(D))).
71. See Nichols, supra note 30, at 47 (stating new look-back period “may cause
individuals to be in a penalty period without benefits or money to pay for their
care”); see also Carlson, supra note 15, at 1311 (noting how individuals who cannot
pay for their long-term care “may face eviction”); Medicaid Planning Guide, supra
note 12 (discussing how individuals must be wary of gifting assets during look-back
period).
72. See Nichols, supra note 30, at 47 (discussing limit on protection of home
equity); see also Levinson, supra note 7, at 225 (noting how individual’s house does
not count when determining Medicaid eligibility).
73. Nichols, supra note 30, at 47 (discussing home equity limit); Transfers of
Assets in Medicaid Program, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS. (Jan. 8, 2008),
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The DRA also limited the use of annuities in Medicaid planning, allowing
only qualified annuities to receive protection under a safe harbor
provision.74
C.

Reason for Appointment: The Use of Annuities in Medicaid Planning

Although individuals have various options when it comes to planning,
annuities are a popular tool used by practitioners and their clients.75 Annuities rose in popularity after Congress “curtailed the use of trusts in
Medicaid planning.”76 When individuals purchase annuities, they “pay[ ]
a sum of money in exchange for a promise that payments will be made to
[them] on an agreed upon schedule and rate.”77
In order for individuals to use annuities in Medicaid planning, they
must be DRA-compliant.78 For an annuity to be exempt from counting as
https://www.cms.gov/regulations-and-guidance/legislation/deficitreductionact/
downloads/toabackgrounder.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7ZZ-UXRR] [hereinafter
CMS Transfer of Assets] (discussing DRA exception for homes). In Pennsylvania,
the limit is $525,000. See Long-Term Care Requirements, supra note 42 (declaring
home equity limit for Pennsylvania applicants).
74. See Nichols, supra note 30, at 47 (“Prior to the DRA, individuals were able
to ‘protect assets’ via commercial annuities.”).
75. See Barnes, supra note 7, at 292 (asserting “sale[s] of annuities [have] increased” since trusts became harder to use in Medicaid planning); see also Marshall,
supra note 57 (illustrating how annuities are used in planning).
76. See Barnes, supra note 7, at 285–86, 292 (citing John M. Broderick, Note,
To Transfer or Not to Transfer: Congress Failed to Stiffen Penalties for Medicaid Estate
Planning, but Should the Practice Continue?, 6 ELDER L.J. 257, 265 (1998)) (comparing congressional action against use of trusts and rise in popularity of annuities).
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “trust” as the following:
1. The right, enforceable solely in equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of
property to which another person holds the legal title; a property interest
held by one person (the trustee) at the request of another (the settlor) for
the benefit of a third party (the beneficiary). For a trust to be valid, it must
involve specific property, reflect the settlor’s intent, and be created for a
lawful purpose . . . . 2. A fiduciary relationship regarding property and
charging the person with title to the property with equitable duties to
deal with it for another’s benefit; the confidence placed in a trustee, together with the trustee’s obligations toward the property and the beneficiary. A trust arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create
it.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1740 (10th ed. 2014). Congress first restricted the use of
trusts with respect to Medicaid planning in 1985 with the Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA). See Barnes, supra note 7, at 285 (summarizing changes in trust policy). Previously, assets held in a trust did not impact an
individual’s Medicaid eligibility. See id. (considering use of trusts in Medicaid planning prior to 1985). In 1993, Congress further restricted the use of trusts by exempting only “irrevocable trust[s] from which the applicant cannot benefit” from
counting as an available resource for purposes of Medicaid eligibility. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(3)(A)-(B) (2012)) (reporting 1993 changes to using
trusts in Medicaid planning).
77. See Barnes, supra note 7, at 292 (defining annuity). See supra note 19 for
the Supreme Court’s definition of annuities.
78. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(c)(1)(F), (G)(ii) (outlining requirements for annuities); see also Zahner v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Human Servs., 802 F.3d 497, 501 (3d
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a resource, it must: (1) be “irrevocable and non-assignable,” (2) be “actuarially sound,” (3) name the state as the “remainder beneficiary,” and
(4) be dispersed in equal payments.79 Transmittal 64 of the State Medicaid
Manual provides guidance regarding annuities, noting that annuities are
considered actuarially sound when “the expected return on the annuity is
commensurate with a reasonable estimate for the life expectancy of the
beneficiary.”80 Annuities are not protected under the DRA’s safe harbor
provision if they are “trust-like.”81
Annuities can be particularly “useful for married couples” seeking
Medicaid assistance for the spouse using long-term care services.82 Because the community spouse’s income has no effect on the other spouse’s
eligibility, the community spouse can purchase an annuity using the
couple’s “excess funds.”83 The annuity payments then count as the community spouse’s income.84
Some individuals may also use annuities to take part in “half-a-loaf
planning.”85 In half-a-loaf planning, individuals gift half of their assets
and “us[e] the remaining one-half to purchase a DRA compliant annuity.”86 Individuals can then use the annuity payments “to pay
for . . . nursing home care” during the penalty period caused by the gifts.87
Cir. 2015) (“The DRA establishes a four-part test for determining whether an annuity is included within the safe harbor and thus not counted as a resource.”).
79. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(c)(1)(F), (G)(ii) (outlining requirements for annuities); see also Zahner, 802 F.3d at 501 (3d Cir. 2015) (acknowledging DRA
requirements).
80. See Jeffrey A. Marshall & Matthew J. Parker, A Guide to Medicaid Annuities
for Pennsylvania Lawyers, PAANNUITY.COM 5, http://www.paannuity.com/pdf/
guide_to_dra_annuities.pdf [https://perma.cc/CY2W-6XSC] (last updated Nov.
19, 2009) (quoting State Medicaid Manual, supra note 37, pt. III, § 3258.9B); see
generally State Medicaid Manual §§ 3257–59, LAW OFFICES OF JOHN W. CALLINAN,
www.eldercarelawyer.com/docs/transmittal64.docx [https://perma.cc/SM8RY87E] (last visited Oct. 25, 2016) [hereinafter Transmittal 64] (discussing use of
annuities and trusts in regards to qualifying for Medicaid).
81. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 510 (noting how Transmittal 64 disallows trust-like
“annuit[ies] from protection in the [DRA’s] safe harbor”); see also Transmittal 64,
supra note 80, at § 3258.9B (“[T]he term ‘trust’ includes an annuity to the extent
and in such manner as the Secretary specifies.”).
82. See Marshall & Parker, supra note 80, at 10–11 (discussing planning options for married couples).
83. See Marshall, supra note 57 (presenting how community spouse can
purchase annuity); see also Marshall & Parker, supra note 80, at 10 (“The purchase
of a DRA annuity by a community spouse does [not] trigger a transfer penalty.”).
84. See Marshall, supra note 57 (presenting purchase of annuity by community
spouse).
85. See Jerold E. Rothkoff, The Zahner Decision—Court Approves Use of Medicaid
Compliant Annuities, ROTHKOFF L. GRP. (Oct. 18, 2015), http://rothkofflaw.com/
the-zahner-decision-court-approves-use-of-medicaid-compliant-annuities/ [https:/
/perma.cc/ZQ3G-234U] (discussing “use of annuities” to engage in half-a-loaf
planning); see also Barnes, supra note 7, at 286–87 (explaining half-a-loaf
planning).
86. See Rothkoff, supra note 85 (describing half-a-loaf planning technique).
87. See id. (explaining annuities are used in half-a-loaf planning).
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Like Medicaid planning in general, states, including Pennsylvania,
disfavor the use of annuities to prevent assets from factoring into an individual’s eligibility for Medicaid.88 The Third Circuit, along with other circuits, has found that annuities are protected and thus exempt under the
DRA so long as they meet the applicable statutory requirements.89 Further, although the Third Circuit has acknowledged loopholes in the Medicaid statute, the court has refused to bar the use of annuities in Medicaid
planning, stating that Congress would have to make any changes to the
law.90 The Third Circuit’s position concerning whether to close Medicaid
loopholes judicially is similar to that of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, the
only other circuit courts to consider the issue, which have also stated that
Congress is responsible for closing loopholes regarding annuities in the
Medicaid statute.91
III. THE EXAMINATION: THE THIRD CIRCUIT ACCEPTS
TERM ANNUITIES IN ZAHNER

THE

USE

OF

SHORT-

In Zahner, the Third Circuit examined the use of annuities to prevent
assets from factoring into Medicaid eligibility determinations.92 The court
88. See Marshall & Parker, supra note 80, at 10 (explaining DHS’s plan “to
treat community spouse annuities . . . as a resource”); Rothkoff, supra note 85
(noting DHS argued that half-a-loaf annuities were not DRA-compliant in Zahner).
89. See Zahner v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Human Servs., 802 F.3d 497, 509 (3d Cir.
2015) (stating “annuities are not barred from the safe harbor”); Weatherbee ex rel.
Vecchio v. Richman, 351 F. App’x 786, 788 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming district
court’s decision that state “improperly denied eligibility for Medicaid benefits” after factoring community spouse’s annuity into eligibility decision); James v. Richman, 547 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We simply cannot allow a denial of
eligibility if there is no statutory justification for that denial.”); see also Geston v.
Anderson, 729 F.3d 1077, 1085 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that community spouse’s
“annuity [is] an uncountable stream of unearned income” and cannot be considered as resource in determining institutionalized spouse’s Medicaid eligibility);
Lopes v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 696 F.3d 180, 188 (2d Cir. 2012) (“We therefore hold
that the payment stream from a non-assignable annuity is not a resource for purposes of determining Medicaid eligibility.”); Morris v. Okla. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 685 F.3d 925, 932–34 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating Congress has not closed
loophole allowing for asset protection using annuities that may provide income to
spouse).
90. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 509 (“Although we are sympathetic to the concerns
the dissent and DHS outline, Congress must resolve them.”); James, 547 F.3d at 219
(“[W]e do not create rules based on our own sense of the ultimate purpose of the
law being interpreted, but rather seek to implement the purpose of Congress as
expressed in the text of the statutes it passed.” (citing Rosenberg v. XM Ventures,
274 F.3d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 2011))).
91. See Geston, 729 F.3d at 1086 (“We see no warrant, however, to implement
any of these measures through judicial decision under the current law and believe
that the suggestions must be directed to the policymaking branches.”); Morris, 685
F.3d at 928 (“Although we understand the district court’s concerns regarding the
exploitation of what can only be described as a loophole in the Medicaid statutes,
we conclude that the problem can only be addressed by Congress.”).
92. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 499 (noting district court’s holding and subsequent
appeal).
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determined that Pennsylvania could not bar the use of annuities and established that the short length of an annuity’s term does not matter, approving the use of short-term annuities in Medicaid planning.93
A.

Taking Height and Weight: Background Facts and Procedure of Zahner

Plaintiffs Donna Claypoole and Connie Sanner both took part in
Medicaid planning to help pay for their long-term care.94 In 2010, Mrs.
Claypoole entered a nursing home while her husband “remained in their
[shared] home.”95 Over a two-year span, the Claypooles made various
gifts to their family members, which “total[ed] over $100,000” and “result[ed] a period of Medicaid ineligibility” for Mrs. Claypoole.96
The Claypooles purchased two annuities, as well.97 Mrs. Claypoole
bought an annuity from ELCO Mutual Life & Annuity (ELCO) for
“$84,874.08 in return for monthly payments of $6,100.22 for [fourteen]
months.”98 She purchased the annuity “to pay for [her] nursing home
care” while she was ineligible for Medicaid due to her previous asset transfers.99 Her husband also purchased an annuity “for which he paid MetLife $45,000.00 in return for monthly payments of $760.20 for five
years.”100 Further, “both [annuity] contracts contained anti-assignment
provisions.”101
93. For further discussion on the Third Circuit’s analysis in Zahner, see infra
notes 120–55 and accompanying text.
94. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 499–500 (summarizing plaintiffs’ need for longterm care). When the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
first heard the case, it discussed a third plaintiff, Anabel Zahner. See Zahner ex rel.
Zahner v. Mackereth (Zahner I), Civil No. 11-306 Erie, 2014 WL 198526, at *2–3
(W.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2014) (referring to Anabel Zahner), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub
nom. Zahner v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Human Servs., 802 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2015). The
Third Circuit, however, did not discuss Ms. Zahner, aside from mentioning her in
the first sentence of the opinion and the accompanying footnote. See Zahner, 802
F.3d at 499 (“Anabel Zahner, Donna Claypoole, and Connie Sanner each applied
for Medicaid institutional care coverage shortly after purchasing a short-term annuity.”). Because Ms. Zahner died, the Third Circuit found “her claim [to be]
moot and she [was] no longer a party[ ]” to the suit. See id. at 499 n.1 (discussing
Anabel Zahner’s role in case).
95. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 499 (discussing Claypoole’s entry into nursing
home). Because Mrs. Claypoole’s husband remained in the home they shared, he
is known as a community spouse. See id. (acknowledging Mr. Claypoole’s status as
community spouse).
96. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 499 (explaining effect of gifts on Mrs. Claypoole’s
eligibility for Medicaid).
97. See id. (identifying Claypooles’ purchase of annuities).
98. See id. (providing details of Mrs. Claypoole’s annuity).
99. See id. (explaining Mrs. Claypoole’s reasoning for purchasing ELCO annuity and planned use of monthly payments).
100. See id. (detailing Mr. Claypoole’s annuity).
101. See id. (discussing specific provisions in annuities contracts).
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Like Ms. Claypoole, Connie Sanner also “entered a nursing home.”102
She purchased an annuity from ELCO for $53,700.00 shortly after entering the nursing home.103 Ms. Sanner then received monthly payments of
$4,499.17 for a year.104 Like Ms. Claypoole, Ms. Sanner purchased an annuity to pay for her care during “a period of Medicaid ineligibility.”105
Because Ms. Sanner had previously made “large financial gift[s]” to her
family, she was penalized and deemed ineligible for a certain time
period.106
In calculating both Mrs. Claypoole’s and Ms. Sanner’s eligibility for
Medicaid, the DHS viewed the various annuities as available resources for
each of them.107 Because DHS included the annuities, both plaintiffs received new penalty periods, which extended their period of Medicaid ineligibility.108 Mrs. Claypoole and Ms. Sanner filed suit against DHS,
“arguing that DHS acted illegally by counting the amount of their respective annuities as an available resource for purpose of Medicaid
eligibility.”109
The district court consolidated Mrs. Claypoole’s and Ms. Sanner’s
suits against DHS.110 Both parties subsequently moved for summary judgment.111 “[T]he [d]istrict [c]ourt partially granted each party’s motion”
for summary judgment.112 The trial court determined that “the plaintiffs’ . . . annuities were sham transactions intended only to shield resources from the calculation of Medicaid eligibility.”113 The court further
102. See id. at 500 (reporting Ms. Sanner was admitted to nursing home in
2011). Unlike Mrs. Claypool, Ms. Sanner did not have a community spouse. See id.
(noting Ms. Sanner “entered a nursing home . . . without a community spouse”).
103. See id. (listing Ms. Sanner’s purchase of annuity from ELCO).
104. See id. (examining details of Ms. Sanner’s annuity).
105. See id. (stating Ms. Sanner’s purpose in purchasing annuity from ELCO).
106. See id. (describing Ms. Sanner’s monetary gifts to children). Ms. Sanner
“transferred $92,000 to her two children for no consideration.” See Zahner ex rel.
Zahner v. Mackereth (Zahner I), Civil No. 11-306 Erie, 2014 WL 198526, at *4
(W.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2014) (noting amount transferred to children and subsequent
penalty), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Zahner v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 802 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2015).
107. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 499–500 (discussing how DHS categorized plaintiffs’ annuities in determining plaintiffs’ Medicaid eligibility).
108. See id. (recounting how plaintiffs were penalized for purchase of
annuities).
109. See id. at 500 (internal quotation marks omitted) (detailing actions
brought against DHS pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)).
110. See id. (noting consolidation of plaintiffs’ suits).
111. See id. (noting “cross motions for summary judgment”).
112. See id. (summarizing district court’s rulings on cross motions).
113. See id. (citing Zahner ex rel. Zahner v. Mackereth, Civil No. 11–306 Erie,
2014 WL 198526, at *12–13 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2014) (agreeing with Pennsylvania
Department of Public Welfare that annuities at issue in Zahner I were “sham products”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Zahner v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Human Servs.,
802 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2015)).
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considered the annuities to be “trust-like,” giving DHS the ability to count
them as available resources.114
The district court also discussed Pennsylvania’s assignment statute.115
Pennsylvania law made “all annuities assignable,” allowing DHS to count
annuities as available resources, even those held by community spouses.116
Because certain annuities are exempt under the DRA, the district court
found that the Pennsylvania statute “was preempted by the federal Medicaid law.”117 Therefore, the district court “held that the nonassignability
clause in [Mr. Claypoole’s], annuity” prevented DHS from counting his
annuity as an available resource, as it conformed to the DRA’s safe harbor
provision.118 The parties cross-appealed to the Third Circuit.119
B.

Diagnosis and Treatment: Short-Term Annuities Are a Viable Planning
Tool in the Third Circuit

The Zahner court determined that short-term annuities could qualify
for the DRA’s safe harbor provision, making them a feasible planning option for those looking to qualify for Medicaid.120 First, the Third Circuit
evaluated whether the plaintiffs’ annuities should be counted as resources
in determining the plaintiffs’ Medicaid eligibility.121 Second, the Third
Circuit examined whether the plaintiffs’ annuities could be considered
trust-like.122 Finally, the Third Circuit undertook a discussion of whether
federal law preempted the Pennsylvania law that made all annuities
assignable.123

114. See id. (citing Zahner I, 2014 WL 198526, at *14) (discussing district
court’s view of plaintiffs’ annuities as “trust-like”).
115. See id. (providing district court’s determination that federal Medicaid law
preempted Pennsylvania’s assignment statute ); see also generally 62 PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 441.6(b) (West 2016) (making all annuities assignable).
116. See id. at 511 (discussing Pennsylvania’s assignment statute).
117. See id. at 500 (acknowledging conflict between federal law and Pennsylvania law).
118. See id. (explaining district court’s holding regarding Mr. Claypoole’s
annuity).
119. See id. (noting appeals filed by parties).
120. See id. at 509 (holding that short-term annuities can be protected under
DRA’s safe harbor provision).
121. See id. at 500–09 (examining whether plaintiffs’ annuities are available
resources).
122. See id. at 510–11 (analyzing whether plaintiffs’ annuities are trust-like).
123. See id. at 511–15 (considering whether federal law preempts Pennsylvania law).
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Annuities Do Not Always Count As Resources in Determining Medicaid
Eligibility

The Third Circuit first analyzed whether the annuities fell under the
DRA’s safe harbor provision.124 For the plaintiffs’ annuities to be protected, the court acknowledged “the annuit[ies] [had to] (1) name the
State as the remainder beneficiary, (2) be irrevocable and nonassignable,
(3) be actuarially sound, and (4) provide for payments in equal amounts
during the term of the annuity, with no deferral and no balloon
payments.”125
First, DHS argued that the plaintiffs’ contracts could not be considered annuities because they cost more than what the plaintiffs’ eventually
received, asserting the contracts were “not investment products” and,
therefore, were not annuities.126 The Third Circuit disagreed.127 Relying
on the Supreme Court’s definition of “annuity,” the Third Circuit stated
that “[i]t is not disputed that each of the annuities here is a transfer of a
sum of money in exchange for a series of payments, continuing for a fixed
period.”128 Further, the court found that annuities are not required to
“provide a certain rate of return.”129
The Third Circuit then tackled DHS’s argument that the “relatively
short terms of [the plaintiffs’] contracts disqualif[ied] them from being
annuities” within the scope of the DRA.130 DHS argued for the Third
Circuit to require all annuities to have a term of at least two years in order
to fall under the safe harbor provision.131 DHS feared that any annuity
124. See id. at 501 (“We must determine if the disputed annuities here are
within this safe harbor and therefore sheltered from inclusion in the plaintiffs’
assets.”).
125. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(c)(1)(F), (G)(ii) (2012)) (referencing requirements for DRA’s safe harbor provision).
126. See id. at 503 (describing DHS’s argument regarding whether plaintiffs’
annuities can be considered investments); see also Brief of Defendant-Appellee/
Cross-Appellant at 34–38, Zahner v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Human Servs., 802 F.3d 497
(3d Cir. 2015) (No 14-1328), 2014 WL 2921383 [hereinafter Brief of Appellee]
(arguing plaintiffs’ annuities should not be considered investments).
127. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 503 (“[W]e see no reason why the relatively shortterm of these instruments necessarily precludes viewing them as
investments . . . .”).
128. See id. (citing NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.,
513 U.S. 251, 254 (1995)) (referring to Supreme Court’s definition of annuity).
For further discussion of the Supreme Court’s definition of “annuity,” see supra
note 17.
129. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 503 (explaining how neither Supreme Court decisions nor statutes require specific return rates for annuities).
130. See id. at 502 (internal quotation marks omitted) (referencing DHS’s argument); see also Brief of Appellee, supra note 126, at 21, 34–38 (arguing plaintiffs’
annuities are not “bona fide annuities”).
131. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 503 (“DHS next asks us to disallow any annuity
that does not have a term of two years or more because Transmittal 64 uses the
plural of ‘years’ in its definition of an annuity.”); see also Brief of Appellee, supra
note 126, at 36 (discussing use of “ ‘term of years’ (plural)”).
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could qualify for the safe harbor, even those lasting only “two seconds,” if
the court did not establish a “floor” on the length of annuities.132 Although the court acknowledged that DHS correctly stated that Transmittal
64 used “term of years,” the court called it a “term of art.”133 Rather than
requiring multiple years, the court concluded the term simply requires the
annuity’s term to be “for some definite period of time.”134 Further, the
Third Circuit felt that imposing a minimum term length would be “an
improper judicial amendment.”135 Because the plaintiffs’ annuities were
of a definite length, the court found that they qualified as terms of
years.136
The Third Circuit also dealt with DHS’s argument that the plaintiffs’
annuities were not “actuarially sound.”137 An annuity is actuarially sound
“if the expected return on the annuity is commensurate with a reasonable
estimate of the life expectancy of the beneficiary.”138 The Third Circuit
stated that annuities met the definition if their terms were for “less than
the annuitant’s reasonable life expectancy.”139 The annuities at issue were
132. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 503–04 (citing Brief of Appellee, supra note 126,
at 36) (discussing DHS’s concerns regarding lack of floor for length of annuities);
see also Brief of Appellee, supra note 126, at 36 (“If there is no floor on the payback
period timeframe then the company could write contracts of two days, two hours,
or even two seconds, and call that contract an ‘annuity.’ ”). In Pennsylvania, the
Commissioner of Insurance must approve all annuities before they can be sold in
the state, leading the court to believe it would be hard for annuities of a very short
length (i.e. “lasting only for hours or a few days”) to “win approval” and to reject
the DHS’s argument that failing to impose a minimum would lead to “sham transactions.” See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 504 (citing Herman v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y.,
108 F.2d 678, 682 (3d Cir. 1939)) (explaining why it would be difficult for very
short annuities to exist).
133. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 505 (“We agree that a term of years is merely a
term of art[.]” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Brief of Appellee, supra note 126, at 18)).
134. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brief of Appellee,
supra note 126, at 18) (discussing what “term of years” means).
135. See id. at 506 (asserting court would not impose “some minimum ratio
between duration of an annuity and life expectancy”).
136. See id. at 505 (“The contracts here, lasting [twelve] and [fourteen]
months, fall within the legal meaning of a ‘term of years’ as each contract permits
multiple, periodic payments, over time, though not indefinitely, and not for a period that is coterminous with the annuitant’s actual life.” (citing NationsBank of
N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 254, 259–60 (1995))).
The Third Circuit also noted that “if Congress intended to limit the safe harbor to
annuities lasting two or more years, it would have been the height of simplicity to
say so.” See id.
137. See id. (discussing DHS’s argument regarding “actuarial sound[ness]” of
plaintiffs’ annuities); see also Brief of Appellee, supra note 126, at 40 (arguing plaintiffs’ annuities were not actuarially sound because length of annuities “ha[d] no
relationship to the plaintiffs’ life expectancies”).
138. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 505 (quoting Transmittal 64, supra note 80, at
§ 3258.9(B)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (defining “actuarially sound”).
139. See id. at 508 (discussing “actuarially sound” annuities).
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deemed actuarially sound because their terms were less than the plaintiffs’
life expectancies.140
Further, the Third Circuit held that an “annuitant’s motive” in
purchasing an annuity is not “determinative” of whether the instrument is
protected.141 Although the court understood that this application of the
Medicaid rules might allow people to take advantage of loopholes, the
court opined that Congress must make efforts to close them.142
2.

Annuities Are Not Always Trusts

The Third Circuit next analyzed whether the plaintiffs’ annuities were
“trust-like.”143 If annuities are trust-like, they cannot fall under the DRA’s
safe harbor.144 The Third Circuit determined that “Transmittal 64 [did]
not present any support for treating [the] annuities as trust-like devices.”145 Rather, Transmittal 64 simply requires that an annuity be actuarially sound, and the court determined that the plaintiffs’ annuities met
this requirement.146 Further, the Third Circuit held that the annuities
were not trusts, rejecting the argument that ELCO owed the plaintiffs any
fiduciary duties.147
3.

Federal Law Preempts Pennsylvania’s Assignment Statute

Finally, the Third Circuit examined whether the DRA preempted
Pennsylvania’s assignment statute.148 First, the Third Circuit noted that
Pennsylvania law made all annuities assignable “regardless of who
purchase[d] them, either the Medicaid applicant . . . or the community
140. See id. at 507 (“[Mrs. Claypoole’s] [fourteen month] annuity was, in fact,
far more commensurate with her actual life expectancy than the actuarial predictions . . . .”). Judge Rendell dissented from the court’s decision. See id. at 515
(Rendell, J., dissenting) (stating she would affirm district court’s ruling). Unlike
the court, Judge Rendell found the plaintiffs’ annuities “were not actuarially
sound” because their terms did not “coincide[ ] with [nor] were [they] commensurate with [the plaintiffs’] life expectancies.” Id. at 516. (explaining why plaintiffs’ annuities were not actuarially sound). Judge Rendell also disagreed with the
court’s definition of actuarially sound, stating that “[i]f Congress simply wanted to
require the annuity terms to be shorter than life expectancy, it could have expressly stated that.” See id.
141. See id. at 509 (citing James v. Richman, 547 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 2008)).
142. See id. (rejecting judicial attempt to close loopholes).
143. See id. at 510 (questioning whether plaintiffs’ annuities could be considered “trust-like”).
144. See id. (discussing Transmittal 64’s restriction on trust-like annuities).
145. See id. at 510–11 (discussing Transmittal 64 and relevance to DHS’s argument that plaintiffs’ annuities were trust-like).
146. See id. at 511 (determining plaintiffs’ annuities satisfied requirements
under Transmittal 64).
147. See id. (“Moreover, these annuities cannot be equated with trusts because
there is nothing akin to a fiduciary relationship between the annuitants and
ELCO.” (citing Transmittal 64, supra note 80, at §§ 3258.9(B), 3259.1(A)(1))).
148. See id. at 511–15 (questioning whether federal law preempted Pennsylvania law).
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spouse.”149 Because annuities must be non-assignable to fall under the
DRA’s safe harbor provision, Pennsylvania’s assignability statute automatically barred all annuities from protection.150
The Third Circuit stated that Pennsylvania, as a participant in the
Medicaid program, must follow federal guidelines and may not enact
“more restrictive requirements,” as compared to the federal government’s
guidelines.151 Regarding annuities, the Third Circuit found Congress’s
policy unambiguous: “annuities with certain characteristics, including
nonassignability clauses, are not assets to be counted as resources for their
Medicaid eligibility.”152 According to the court, by enacting the assignability statute, Pennsylvania impermissibly limited this federal
protection.153
Additionally, the Third Circuit found nothing to support DHS’s position that Congress gave states the option to choose to exclude annuities as
resources.154 Therefore, the Third Circuit upheld the portion of the district court’s holding stating that federal law preempted Pennsylvania’s assignment statute.155
149. See id. at 511 (citing 62 PA. STAT. ANN. § 441.6(b) (West 2016)) (discussing Pennsylvania assignability statute). The statute reads as follows:
Any provision in any annuity or other contract for the payment of money
owned by an applicant or recipient of medical assistance, or owned by a
spouse or other legally responsible relative of such applicant or recipient,
that has the effect of limiting the right of such owner to sell, transfer or
assign the right to receive payments thereunder or restricts the right to
change the designated beneficiary thereunder is void.
62 PA. STAT. ANN. § 441.6(b).
150. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 511 (“Thus, if § 441.6(b) controls, no Medicaid
applicant or his or her spouse can exclude an annuity from being considered a
resource for purposes of Medicaid eligibility because Pennsylvania makes all annuities assignable.” (citing 62 PA. STAT. ANN. § 441.6(b))).
151. See id. at 512, 515 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i)(III) (2012))
(discussing requirements of states in Medicaid program).
152. See id. at 514 (explaining Congressional intent behind 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1396p(c)(1)(F)–(G)).
153. See id. at 515 (declaring Pennsylvania’s statute to be invalid). In Zahner,
the Third Circuit employed the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning from Geston to show
when a state’s law is more restrictive than the federal government’s: “[i]f the
State’s public policy requires it to count as resources certain annuities that federal
law excludes from the scope of resources that may be considered in making eligibility determinations, then the State’s methodology is more restrictive than the
federal methodology.” See id. at 514 (alteration in original) (quoting Geston v.
Anderson, 729 F.3d 1077, 1085–86 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
154. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 514 (“The Medicaid Act cannot reasonably be
read to support DHS’s contention that Congress intended to make protection of
annuities optional.” (citing United States v. Voight, 89 F.3d 1050, 1087 (3d Cir.
1996))). DHS argued federal law “[did] not create an impermeable safe harbor.”
See id. at 512 (citing Brief of Appellee, supra note 126, at 31–33). Instead, Pennsylvania had “the option of allowing annuities to be excluded” as available resources, which it did “not exercise.” See id. (providing DHS’s position).
155. See id. at 515 (“Pennsylvania may not create more restrictive requirements.” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i)(III))).
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CONSULT: ANALYZING THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S APPROVAL
OF SHORT-TERM ANNUITIES

Zahner is a win for elder law practitioners and their clients in the
Third Circuit.156 By holding that federal law preempts Pennsylvania law,
the Third Circuit solidified DRA-compliant annuities as viable Medicaid
planning tools in Pennsylvania.157 Further, the Third Circuit broke new
ground by determining annuities cannot be barred from the DRA’s safe
harbor because of the shortness of their terms.158
A.

The Third Circuit Observes Federal Preemption in Holding Pennsylvania
Cannot Bar Use of Annuities

In Zahner, the Third Circuit preserved federal law’s place in the administration of Medicaid.159 The Third Circuit accurately recognized that
states “must . . . comply with federal [standards],” such as the DRA, in
creating rules for their respective programs.160 As the court correctly determined, states are not free to disregard federal law, even if it conflicts
with their desire to toughen eligibility requirements for Medicaid.161
Although Congress intended to close loopholes in the Medicaid statute by enacting the DRA, it nonetheless created a safe harbor provision for
annuities.162 As the Third Circuit correctly noted, Pennsylvania’s assign156. See Zumpano, supra note 19 (“It is exciting knowing that short-term annuities are a valid planning tool, in accordance with the Third Circuit’s decision.”); see also infra notes 184–95 (discussing how elder law attorneys may use
short-term annuities in planning and Zahner’s effect on Medicaid planning).
157. For an examination of the Third Circuit’s observation of federal preemption, see infra notes 159–71 and accompanying text.
158. For an analysis of the Third Circuit’s decision to allow short-term annuities, see infra notes 172–83 and accompanying text.
159. See Levinson, supra note 7, at 225 (discussing joint involvement of federal
and state governments in Medicaid); see also Reif, supra note 10, at 344 (“The federal government shares the cost of the Medicaid program with the states, who must
ensure their programs comply with federal Medicaid requirements and regulations.” (footnote omitted)).
160. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i)(III) (stating that state eligibility requirements cannot be “more restrictive” than those for determining eligibility for
supplementary security income); id. § 1396a(r)(2)(B) (“For purposes of this subsection and subsection (a)(10) of this section, methodology is considered to be ‘no
more restrictive’ if, using the methodology, additional individuals may be eligible
for medical assistance and no individuals who are otherwise eligible are made ineligible for such assistance.”); see also CMS Transfer of Assets, supra note 73 (stating
states must update their Medicaid regulations to comply with DRA); Reif, supra
note 10, at 344 (discussing how states must follow federal regulations).
161. See Reif, supra note 10, at 344 (noting states must comply with federal
rules); see also Higgins, supra note 13 (noting that “[s]tates and counties have begun to crack down on people” taking part in Medicaid planning).
162. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(c)(1)(F), (G)(ii) (2012) (creating safe harbor for
annuities); Zahner v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Human Servs., 802 F.3d 497, 501–02 (3d
Cir. 2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(c)(1)(F), (G)(ii)) (explaining DRA’s safe
harbor provision for annuities); see also Nichols, supra note 30, at 46 (commenting
on Congress’s purpose in enacting DRA).
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ment statute directly conflicted with the DRA’s safe harbor provision.163
Application of Pennsylvania’s assignability statute would have barred otherwise qualified annuities from receiving protection, regardless of whether
the annuities included anti-assignment clauses.164 Consequently, using
annuities in Medicaid planning would have been futile in Pennsylvania
because DHS would have had the ability to count them as available
resources.165
The Zahner court properly safeguarded the use of annuities by holding that the DRA’s safe harbor preempted Pennsylvania’s assignment statute.166 In creating the DRA’s safe harbor provision, Congress intended
for certain annuities to be protected, such as those with anti-assignment
provisions.167 Pennsylvania’s statute frustrated congressional intent.168
The Zahner court’s decision to recognize preemption falls in line with
Third Circuit precedent, which also found that federal law preempted
Pennsylvania’s assignment statute.169 Although other circuits have not
dealt specifically with preemption, they have generally recognized
statutory-compliant annuities as protected.170 Therefore, the Zahner
163. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 513 (“Congress did not intend that all annuities
be considered [available resources].”).
164. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 511 (noting Pennsylvania statute made “all annuities” assignable). The Third Circuit noted that “no Medicaid applicant [could]
exclude an annuity from being considered [an available] resource” because of the
Pennsylvania assignability statute. See id. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(G)(ii)
(requiring annuities to be assignable), with 62 PA. STAT. ANN. § 441.6(b) (West
2016) (rendering all annuities assignable).
165. See 62 PA. STAT. ANN. § 441.6(b) (requiring all annuities be available as
resources regardless of who holds them).
166. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 515 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i)(III))
(holding “Pennsylvania may not create more restrictive requirements”); see also
Zumpano, supra note 19 (“[T]he state must acknowledge the assignability of an
annuity in accordance with the intent of Congress.”).
167. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 513 (“Congress clearly intended for some annuities to be considered [available] resources for the purposes of Medicaid eligibility.
However, it is equally clear that Congress did not intend that all annuities be
considered.”).
168. See id. at 513–15 (discussing congressional intent regarding annuities
and how Pennsylvania law cannot be valid).
169. See Weatherbee ex rel. Vecchio v. Richman, 351 F. App’x 786, 788 (3d Cir.
2009) (holding federal law preempted Pennsylvania’s assignment statute because it
“narrow[ed] the annuity exemption”).
170. See Geston v. Anderson, 729 F.3d 1077, 1085 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding
community spouse’s annuity is “unearned income, not a resource” in determining
Medicaid eligibility of spouse receiving care); Lopes v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 696
F.3d 180, 188 (2d Cir. 2012) (“We therefore hold that the payment stream from a
non-assignable annuity is not a resource for purposes of determining Medicaid
eligibility.”); Morris v. Okla. Dep’t of Human Servs., 685 F.3d 925, 933–34 (10th
Cir. 2012) (citing Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–432,
120 Stat. 2922, 2998; Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109–171,
§§ 6011–6012, 120 Stat. 4, 62–64) (determining Congress has not closed loophole
allowing for individuals to protect assets in annuities “capable of producing uncountable spousal income”).
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court properly solidified DRA-compliant annuities as viable planning
tools.171
B.

The Third Circuit Breaks New Ground by Approving Short-Term Annuities

However, the Zahner decision raises several concerns.172 The court’s
holding seems to conflict with the goal of restricting Medicaid eligibility.173 Allowing short-term annuities expands the type of financial tools
available to individuals interested in Medicaid planning.174 Individuals
may try to push the limit on acceptable term lengths, going even shorter
than the annuities at issue in Zahner, because no minimum term is re171. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 514 (stating “Pennsylvania cannot enact legislation that changes federal law (or binding judicial interpretation of federal law)
with respect to annuities” (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803))); see also
Zumpano, supra note 19 (“Pennsylvania DHS argued that this law caused all annuities purchased by Medicaid applicants in Pennsylvania to fail the safe harbor test.
The District Court and Third Circuit held that this is untrue.”).
172. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 126, at 36 (“If there is no floor on the
payback period timeframe then the company could write contracts of two days, two
hours, or even two seconds, and call that contract an ‘annuity.’ ”); Moses, supra
note 33, at 565 (stating DRA is intended to limit Medicaid eligibility); Nichols,
supra note 30, at 46 (noting Congressional intent to close loopholes with DRA);
LATSHA DAVIS & MCKENNA, P.C., Third Circuit Greenlights Short-Term Medicaid
Annuities (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.ldylaw.com/blog/2016/01/third-circuitgreenlights-short-term-medicaid-annuities.shtml [https://perma.cc/ZQ3D-Y26S]
(“Congress intended the passage of the DRA to curb certain Medicaid planning
strategies such as ‘half-a-loaf’ gifting . . . . Zahner explicitly allows short-term annuities to be used in this manner.”); see also Court Approves Use of Short-Term Annuities for
Medicaid Planning, ELDER L. ANSWERS (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.elderlawan
swers.com/court-approves-use-of-short-term-annuities-for-medicaid-planning—15
317 [hereinafter Court Approves] (“Although the Third Circuit is only one of 13
federal appeals courts, the court noted its opinion is ‘precedential’ federal law for
Medicaid-compliant annuities.”). For further discussion of case law involving the
use of annuities in Medicaid planning, see supra notes 88–91 and accompanying
text.
173. See Higgins, supra note 13 (finding governments are working on restricting Medicaid eligibility); Levinson, supra note 7, at 227 (discussing efforts to limit
use of Medicaid planning).
174. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 126, at 36–38 (arguing safe harbor protection for plaintiffs’ will lead to more “sham” annuities). Allowing short-term annuities may have negative consequences for those truly who need Medicaid to pay
for long-term care because it could lead to an expansion in eligibility. See
Markovic, supra note 12, at 1857 (asserting “Medicaid claimants who do meet eligibility criteria are harmed when individuals who are not medically impaired or financially impoverished receive benefits” because “funding for . . . Medicaid is
limited” (citing Jason J. Fichtner, Social Security Disability Fund Will Run Empty Next
Year, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 3, 2015, 10:43 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/
story/social-security-disability-fund-will-run-empty-next-year-2015-04-03 [https://pe
rma.cc/GL46-S55D])); see also Timothy L. Takacs & David L. McGuffey, Medicaid
Planning: Can It Be Justified? Legal and Ethical Implications of Medicaid Planning, 29
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 111, 132–35 (2002) (discussing common objections to
Medicaid planning).
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quired.175 The decision also permits half-a-loaf planning, which Congress
sought to proscribe with the DRA.176
Additionally, the court’s reliance on plain readings of the DRA and
Transmittal 64 unquestionably allows individuals to take advantage of a
loophole and shield their assets.177 Expanding the use of a Medicaid
loophole directly undercuts the federal and state governments’ goal of
narrowing Medicaid eligibility.178 Nevertheless, neither the DRA nor
Transmittal 64 imposes a minimum term length for annuities, leaving the
Third Circuit entirely free to reject DHS’s request for a judicially-imposed
minimum term length, rightly allowing people to shelter assets in a safe
harbor Congress created.179 Although potentially expanding eligibility
seems to conflict directly with Congress’s goal, the Third Circuit justifiably
worked within the framework Congress itself provided to find the use of
short-term annuities viable, following Eighth and Tenth Circuit prece175. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 126, at 36–38 (“ELCO is already writing
contracts as short as two months.”); cf. Markovic, supra note 12, at 1854 (discussing
how some Medicaid planning strategies violate ethical boundaries and are harmful
to those who actually need help in paying for long-term care).
176. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 126, at 38 (discussing Congress’s addition of “half-a-loaf gifting prohibition” through DRA); LATSHA DAVIS & MCKENNA,
P.C., supra note 172 (commenting that Zahner allows for “half-a-loaf” planning); see
also Rothkoff, supra note 85 (“Since 2005, [DHS’s] position was that the annuities
used in half-a-loaf gifting were not DRA-compliant.”). For an explanation of “halfa-loaf planning,” see supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.
177. See Zahner v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Human Servs., 802 F.3d 497, 509 (3d Cir.
2015) (discussing Transmittal 64 and use of annuities to “shelter assets”); see also id.
at 516 (Rendell, J., dissenting) (“If Congress simply wanted to require the annuity
terms to be shorter than life expectancy, it could have expressly stated that. Instead, Congress said that annuities must be actuarially sound . . . meaning that
annuities must be commensurate with or coincide with life expectancy.”). In her
dissent, Judge Rendell argued that there was no basis for the court to determine
“that an annuity with a term that is less than the annuitant’s life expectancy passes
the actuarial soundness test.” See id. Judge Rendell opined that this definition
would allow for annuities that “[have] no investment purpose and operate[ ] only
to shield assets.” See id.
178. See id. at 509 (noting DHS’s concerns in allowing short-term annuities).
In addition to undercutting the federal and state governments’ goal of narrowing
Medicaid eligibility, expanding eligibility also raises questions about the ethics of
Medicaid planning. See Takacs & McGuffey, supra note 174, at 132–35 (outlining
common objections to Medicaid planning, including ideas that “Medicaid planning will lead to a deprivation of health care from the truly needy, those who are
really poor, not those who have artificially impoverished themselves in order to
qualify for Medicaid,” and that “Medicaid planning may be legal, but it is against
public policy”); see also Patricia F. Sitchler, Cutting Edge vs. over the Edge: Ethics and
Malpractice Issues for Medicaid Planning, 2 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 175,
183–86 (2009) (describing why some individuals see Medicaid planning as
unethical).
179. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 506 (“[W]e conclude that any attempt to fashion a
rule that would create some minimum ratio between duration of an annuity and
life expectancy would constitute an improper judicial amendment of the applicable statutes and regulations.”); see also supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text
(discussing DRA’s safe harbor provision for annuities).
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dents by choosing to leave the responsibility of closing any loopholes to
Congress.180
The Third Circuit’s opinion also alleviates DHS’s fear that individuals
will be able to protect assets through annuities lasting for very short durations.181 Pennsylvania’s Commissioner of Insurance must approve all annuities, making it “doubt[ful] that an annuity lasting two seconds, two
hours, or [even] two days would win approval.”182 Further, the Third Circuit’s refined definition of “actuarially sound” still achieves a key objective
of federal and state governments—by requiring an annuity’s term to be
less than an individual’s life expectancy, it allows states to recover a portion of the money spent on long-term care.183
V.

DOSAGE INSTRUCTIONS: GUIDANCE FOR ELDER LAW PRACTITIONERS
USING SHORT-TERM ANNUITIES

Following Zahner, Third Circuit elder law practitioners have a clearer
picture of the requirements for DRA-compliant annuities.184 To serve
their clients best, elder law attorneys must ensure that annuities comply
with all four elements of the DRA’s safe harbor provision.185 Although
three of the four elements were easily established before Zahner, the Third
180. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 509 (“Although we are sympathetic to the concerns the dissent and DHS outline, Congress must resolve them.”). The Zahner
holding was consistent with the holdings of other circuit courts. See Geston v. Anderson, 729 F.3d 1077, 1086 (8th Cir. 2013) (“We see no warrant . . . to implement
any of these measures through judicial decision . . . and believe that the suggestions must be directed to the policymaking branches.”); Morris v. Okla. Dep’t of
Human Servs., 685 F.3d 925, 928 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Although we understand the
district court’s concerns regarding the exploitation of what can only be described
as a loophole in the Medicaid statutes, we conclude that the problem can only be
addressed by Congress.”).
181. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 504 (noting Commissioner of Insurance must approve annuities before they can be purchased in Pennsylvania).
182. See id. (citing Herman v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 108 F.2d 678, 682 (3d
Cir. 1939)) (rejecting DHS’s argument that sham transactions would “gain[ ] a
foothold in the marketplace”).
183. See id. at 508 (“[I]t discourages the purchase of annuities for terms that
are so long that assets would pass to heirs and not be available to reimburse the
State for the Medicaid assistance the annuitant received while alive.” (citing Brief
for National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, Inc., and Its Pennsylvania and New
Jersey Chapters as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 4, 30–31, Zahner v. Sec’y
Pa. Dep’t of Human Servs., 802 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1328))).
184. See Zumpano, supra note 19 (“The Third Circuit’s decision sets a precedent [that] is important for [e]lder [l]aw practitioners, not only in Pennsylvania,
but potentially in our field at large.”); see also Zahner Follow-Up: Medicaid Annuities
in Practice, KRAUSE AGENCY, INC. (Oct. 1, 2015), http://thekrauseagency.com/
2015/10/01/zahner-followup-2/ [https://perma.cc/DYG7-RMVB] (discussing
Zahner decision and noting “[t]he clarity with which each issue was addressed
makes it a valuable model for other states, and other courts, as they consider similar situations”).
185. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(c)(1)(F), (G)(ii) (2012) (listing requirements for
DRA’s safe harbor provision).
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Circuit provided clarity regarding the meaning of “actuarially sound,” delivering essential guidance to those seeking to use annuities in planning.186 When determining the length of an annuity, elder law attorneys
must ensure the annuity’s term does not “exceed [the purchaser’s] reasonable life expectancy.”187
Further, elder law attorneys within the Third Circuit should not feel
uneasy about whether their clients’ annuities will be deemed “too short” to
qualify for protection under the DRA’s safe harbor.188 Because Congress
has not set a minimum term length for annuities, attorneys whose clients
need annuities only for as little as twelve or fourteen months, like the
plaintiffs in Zahner, should feel confident in their ability to find protection
in the DRA’s safe harbor.189 Additionally, for practitioners with less affluent clients, short-term annuities are a great planning option because they
require a lower, “upfront cost.”190
VI. PROGNOSIS: THE FUTURE OF SHORT-TERM ANNUITIES
MEDICAID PLANNING

IN

After Zahner, elder law practitioners are free to use short-term annuities while guiding their clients through the Medicaid planning process.191
186. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 508 (discussing “actuarially sound” element);
Zumpano, supra note 19 (“The Third Circuit also offers a more clear definition of
what a period of time is for purchases of Medicaid Qualified Annuities, allowing
purchases for less than a term of years if the time period of payout is in proportion
to the annuitant’s life expectancy.”).
187. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 508 (determining appropriate length of annuity
to be considered “actuarially sound”).
188. See id. at 505 (“Congress did not require any minimum term for an annuity to qualify under the safe harbor.” (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(c)(1)(F),
(G)(ii))).
189. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 503 (“[W]e see no reason why the relatively shortterm of these instruments necessarily precludes viewing them as investments, and
Congress has not foreclosed that possibility.”); see also Linda Ershow-Levenberg,
Third Circuit Rejects State’s Claim That Short-Term Annuities Can’t Meet Medicaid Requirements, FINK ROSNER ERSHOW-LEVENBERG LLC (Sept. 2, 2015), http://bl
og.finkrosnerershow-levenberg.com/elder-law-news/third-circuit-rejects-statesclaim-that-short-term-annuities-cant-meet-medicaid-requirements/ [https://pe
rma.cc/WF6D-PE6Y] (discussing how Third Circuit found “no lawful basis to impose any additional criteria concerning the length of [an] annuity contract”);
Zahner Follow-Up, supra note 184 (stating elder law practitioners should feel “comfortable in recommending [short-term annuities]”); Zumpano, supra note 19 (stating how Zahner is “solid legal precedent” regarding short-term annuities).
190. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 508 n.14 (describing benefits of short-term
annuities).
191. See Zumpano, supra note 19 (discussing what Zahner holding means for
elder law practitioners); see also Kemp Scales, Third Circuit Court of Appeals Approves
Use of Short-Term Annuities in Medicaid Planning, SCALES L. OFFICES, http://
www.scaleslawoffices.com/11-2015%203rd%20Circuit%20Approves%20ShortTerm%20Annunities.pdf [https://perma.cc/77ZE-XNFG] (last visited Oct. 18,
2016) (explaining how Zahner decision “is a major victory for seniors in the Third
Circuit”); Cyril Tuohy, Federal Court: Short-Term Annuities Do Not Count Toward Medicaid, INS. NEWS NET (Sept. 10, 2015), http://insurancenewsnet.com/innarticle/
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The Third Circuit will not bar the use of qualified short-term annuities in
Medicaid planning, instead leaving any change in policy to Congress.192
Therefore, until Congress acts, short-term annuities are a viable planning
tool in the Third Circuit for the foreseeable future.193 For people who
wish to leave assets to loved ones, Zahner presents good news.194 Rather
than causing people to exhaust their savings on long-term care, Zahner
provides individuals greater ability to protect resources through Medicaid
planning.195
federal-court-short-term-annuities-dont-count-towards-medicaid [https://pe
rma.cc/S9TT-NC5X] (“Certainly it is favorable for elderly families, particularly if
they are not of great means.” (quoting Zahner plaintiffs’ attorney)).
192. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 509 (“[T]he definition of protected annuities is
one best left to the policymakers in the legislative branch.”).
193. See id. (stating Congress must make any changes regarding annuities);
see also LATSHA DAVIS & MCKENNA, P.C., supra note 172 (stating “Zahner explicitly
allows short-term annuities to be used” in half-a-loaf planning).
194. See Rothkoff, supra note 85 (“Persons requiring nursing facility care will
have an additional planning technique available to them that potentially can preserve a large portion of their assets to their family.”); Scales, supra note 191 (discussing how Zahner decision will benefit single applicants and married applicants
when applying for Medicaid).
195. See Rothkoff, supra note 85 (noting how Zahner allows for people to protect assets for their families); see also More on Short Term Annuities, supra note 15
(“[Zahner] helps to clarify for the elder law client what financial products will not
disqualify a Medicaid applicant from applying for benefits.”).
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